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The efficient market theorem states that market prices reflect all available information 
(Fama).  Therefore, in the absence of transaction costs expected returns will be the same 
no matter when grain is priced.  The only theoretical way that farmers can out perform 
the market is to get information first or to have superior analytical ability.  More than 
likely, farmers will not have either.  If the theory does not hold then large producers 
would be justified in purchasing private information to receive a higher price. 
Producers have a number of choices of what to do when it comes to marketing 
their wheat.  Producers can either sell before harvest, at harvest, or after harvest.  There is 
little known on how producers make their decisions, because few studies have examined 
actual producer data (McNew and Musser; and Slusher). Brorsen and Irwin call for 
researchers to start making use of actual data to understand what producers are doing.  
Only through the use of actual data can researchers measure the effectiveness of past 
research and discover new areas of economics that need to be explored. 
  Behavioral finance is a fairly recent concept in finance literature.  Behavioral 
finance is the study of actual human actions and how humans behave in the market place.  
It focuses on how people make decisions based on factors that are not directly market 
related or for other personal reasons that make people believe that these factors do 
determine the future or current price.  Barber and Odean (2000; 2001) found that 
overconfidence leads to bad marketing decisions and typically men carry this trait.  
Odean found irrational behavior with stock portfolios, Wang found it in the futures 
market, it has been found in wheat markets (Brorsen; Brorsen and Anderson), and corn 
and soybean markets (Irwin, Martines-Filho, and Good).  Shiller explains these different 
behaviors through classifying certain types of behavior in to certain categories.  Harwood   2
et al. claim people act differently based on how they view risk.  People have biases and 
certain biases lead them to making decisions that sometimes results in outcomes that are 
not what they expected (Kahneman).  Zulauf and Irwin have come up with the most 
complete categorization of marketing strategies.  He categorizes them under routine, 
systematic, strategies based on individual-generated forecasts, and strategies based on 
market-generated forecasts.  Behavioral finance may appear to disprove the efficient 
markets hypothesis, but as people make their mistakes they will change them and use 
mechanical marketing strategies instead of psychological (Brorsen).  These behavioral 
decisions can lead to certain marketing strategies that farmers will follow.  Producers can 
change these behavioral fallacies through research that determines what causes 
differences in net price per bushel between producers.  At this time it is not important to 
understand why producers make these decisions, but to recognize what decisions are 
causing the differences in net price realized by producers.  This article does not focus on 
categorizing the people themselves, but on what factors explain the differences in net 
price received by producers.  
Through examining the actual farmer data, certain details that differentiate 
producers can be investigated.  These differences in marketing decisions could be related 
to gender, volume a producer markets, or other cash marketing characteristics.  Through 
studying producer marketing decisions certain mistakes farmers make can be identified.  
For example, a mistake a farmer could be making is that they could be holding their 
wheat so long that storage costs consume all their profits.  The behavioral finance 
literature would describe farmers as exhibiting myopic loss aversion when they store past 
the economically optimal point in order to postpone selling at a loss.   3
Recent studies with gender have shown that there are differences in how men and 
women approach economic decisions.  Barber and Odean (2001) found that men often 
trade stocks more than women and thus men receive lower returns than women.  It was 
also found that men exhibited overconfidence in believing that they could out perform 
others through their own decisions.  This study was performed on common stocks and 
perhaps a similar scenario could be true for marketing cash grain.   
This article first determines if differences in net price per bushel received by 
wheat producers on the cash market can be explained by (a) total annual volume sold by 
the producer, (b) frequency of weekly sales, (c) average week of sales after harvest, and 
(d) gender.  Then the article measures differences in marketing styles by gender for 
average week of sales after harvest and frequency of sales. 
 
Data 
Data are from three grain elevators located in the north, south, and center of western 
Oklahoma.  The data are from the harvest of 1992 through the spring of 2001 (nine crop 
years).  The data contain all individual transactions of wheat sales at each elevator.  Each 
transaction has the seller, number of bushels, price per bushel, and date.  However, each 
seller’s name was not always spelled correctly and some sellers operated under a variety 
of names. To remedy this problem, elevator managers were asked to identify the primary 
marketing decision maker and their gender for each sale.  This was done by giving the 
elevator managers a spreadsheet containing the seller names, and then they identified the 
primary decision maker for each seller.  In table 2, the descriptive statistics by gender and 
elevator are given.     4
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Each Elevator 
Descriptive Statistics  South  Central  North 
Average price  3.41  3.32  3.39 
Average net price  3.35  3.12  3.17 
Harvest price  3.47  3.20  3.39 
Number of observations  14434  7089  6389 
 Percent harvest sales  58 %  19 %  14 % 
Average week  5  16  18 
 
Table 2.  Gender Descriptive Statistics by Elevator 
















South Male  154  8.66  2.05  7.64  61.90 
 Female  12  8.43  1.58  3.53  28.07 
Central Male  214  14.47  2.46  4.87  37.86 
 Female  70  16.97  1.51  2.17  16.62 
North Male  129  16.87  3.47  9.90  67.23 
 Female  8  16.14  2.73  4.88  36.76 
 
A number of other data errors were also corrected, and some transactions were 
deleted from the data set.  First, the northern elevator is missing transactions from 5/1/98 
to 6/1/99.  Second, if the price per bushel was less than $1.50, it was deleted.  The reason 
for deletion was that the transaction was probably for wheat cleanings or a data entry 
error.  If the price per bushel was greater than $10.05, it was deleted.  The reason for 
deletion was that the transaction was probably a data entry error.  The $10.05 amount is 
the high cut off, because it was the lowest extremity on the high side of price.  The other 
prices that were high were similar or near other prices around the same date.  Another   5
deletion within the data set included, transactions that had negative bushels.  These 
transactions were deleted because they identify purchases rather than sales.  If an elevator 
manager suggested the transaction be deleted, then it was deleted as well as transactions 
with missing data (such as a missing name, bushels, or price).  Data are still included 
when the elevator manager could not easily determine a decision maker for that seller 
name.  It is assumed that the same seller was the decision maker all 8 years for 
transactions where a name was included but decision maker could not be determined.   
  Many of the transactions for decision makers happen on the same day or on days 
close to each other.  Since the number of transactions is a variable being examined, the 
transactions have been lumped into weeks.  Thus, if there were 24 transactions within a 
specified seven-day period
1, they would count as one transaction.  Therefore if a seller 
has X transactions, this means the seller traded in X different weeks. 
Local harvest dates differ.  The southern elevator’s harvest is assumed to be May 
25 thru June 21, the central elevator’s harvest is assumed to be June 1 thru June 27, and 
the northern elevator’s harvest is assumed to be June 12 thru July 7.  Storage costs and 
interest costs used are determined the same way for all elevators.  The storage cost, set by 
the elevators, averages $.00085/day, which is $.0255/month.  The interest cost is 
calculated at the prime rate for that year plus 2%.  The prime rate is the prime rate 
charged by banks in June for that year, quoted from the Kansas City Federal Reserve 
Bank.  Multiplying the interest rate by June wheat price and then dividing the product by 
365 days gives interest cost per day.  The June wheat price is the June price quote for 
wheat in Oklahoma for that year from the National Ag Statistics Service.  The cost of 
                                                 
1 There are weekend sales during harvest.   6
carry is then figured per day.  Table 3 shows the interest, storage, and combined carrying 
costs per day. 
Table 3.  Interest, Storage, and Carrying Costs 











92 8.50%  $3.27  .075  .085  .160 
93 8.00%  $2.54  .070  .085  .155 
94 9.25%  $3.07  .081  .085  .166 
95 11.00%  $3.88  .096  .085  .181 
96 10.25%  $5.48  .090  .085  .175 
97 10.25%  $3.28  .090  .085  .175 
98 9.75%  $2.62  .085  .085  .170 
99 11.50%  $2.31  .101  .085  .186 
00 9.00%  $2.50  .079  .085  .164 
 
The selling prices net of interest and storage costs are 
(1)  )
365
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+
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where i is the producer, t is the year,  d is the number of days after harvest, netpriceitd is 
the net price, Pd  is the price received on day d, P0  is the harvest price for that year, zt is 
the prime interest rate for that year, and Sd  is the storage cost/day. 
 
Procedures 
The procedures include first a linear regression to determine if differences in net price per 
bushel received by western Oklahoma wheat producers on the cash market can be 
explained by (a) total annual volume sold by the producer, (b) frequency of weekly sales, 
(c) average week of sales after harvest, and (d) gender, and second regressions to 
determine if gender differences exist for each of these independent variables.     7
Regression Model 
The following regression is estimated using maximum likelihood: 
(2)  it i it it it
j
jt j it gender frequency awk tvol year lprice ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = ∑
=
5 4 3 2
8
1
1 0  
where i is the producer, t is the year,  lpriceit is the log of apriceit the bushel-weighted net 
price for producer i in year t, yeart is a dummy variable for each year, tvolit is the total 
volume producer i sells in year t,  awkit is the yearly bushel-weighted mean weeks after 
harvest when wheat was sold by producer i, frequencyit is the number of different weeks 
producer i sold wheat in year t, genderi is a dummy variable that accounts for producer i 
being male or female, and εit is the error term.
2  The plots of error terms versus awkit for 
the OLS model with apriceit as function of yeart, tvolit, awkit, frequencyit, and genderi 
exhibited heteroskedasticity with variance increasing for either high or low values of 
awkit.  The plots are shown in Figures 1.  The plots exhibited the need for a quadratic 
adjustment to the model.   εit is defined as 
(3)  ) , 0 ( ~
2
i it N σ ε  
and the variance of εit (σi
2) is defined as 
(4)  [] α Zi exp
2 = i σ  
(5)  [ ] i it it it it i gender frequency tvol awk awk
2 1 = Z  
to adjust for heteroskedasticity.   
Two other misspecification tests, tests for random effects and nonlinearity, will be 
used to examine the model.  Random effects need to be tested because the regression uses 
                                                 
2 Number of transactions, transit, and transaction standard deviation, transsdt, were also considered but 
were not significant and were dropped from the model since theory to support their inclusion was weak.   8
panel data and there is a possibility that some omitted variables may be constant over 
time, but differ between producers.  To measure this, random effects are tested using a 
maximum likelihood test.  Tests for nonlinearity will also be done as another 
misspecification test.  Two nonlinearity tests were done.  The first test was done by 
adding the log term of the tvolit variable and squared term of the awkit variable and testing 
the new variables significance.  However, no significant results were found.  The second 
test is a reset test done by adding the predicted value of the dependent variable into the 
regression.  This test showed more conclusive evidence.  The null hypothesis is Ho: γ = 0 
and the alternative is not H0.  If Ho is rejected then there is nonlinearity. 
   The awkit is calculated as follows 
(6)  it
w





where w is the week
3, tvolitw is the bushels sold by producer i in year t and week w, wkitw 
is the weeks after harvest that the transaction occurred, and tvolit is total bushels sold by 
producer i in year t.   
The dependent variable in (2) is the log of annual bushel weighted price by 
producer, lpriceit.  The annual bushel-weighted mean price is  










where i is the producer, t is the year, d is the day, buitd is the bushels sold that day by a 
producer, and tvolit is yearly total volume of bushels sold per producer.  
                                                 
3 Based on four-week harvest, so 48 weeks in a marketing year.   9
Gender Regression Models 
For this procedure two regression models will be run to measure differences between 
genders.  The first regression has frequencyit as a function of genderi and tvolit, and the 
second has awkit as a function of genderi and tvolit. These regressions will help to 
determine if women and men differ in their marketing styles of choosing when and how 
often to sell.  The first regression is 
(8)  it it i
j
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and the second regression is 
(9)  it it i
j





1 0 . 
Depending on the sign and the significance of the genderi variable, will determine if men 




The null model likelihood test revealed that the model adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
gave a more significant estimate of the dependent variable.  The adjustment for 
heteroskedasticity was accomplished through shifting the variance.  The variance is 
defined through equations (3), (4), and (5).  The null hypothesis was tested using the χ
2-
distribution where H0: α0 = α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 = α5 = 0, and reject H0 if Likelihood Ratio 
Statistic (LR) > χ
2.  Table 4 shows the LR statistics and the α’s for equation (4).  For 
each region H0 is rejected at the 99% level, thus showing the model adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity is a suitable model.   10
 
 Table 4.  Estimates of the Multiplicative Variance Equation by Elevator 
Alphas Explanatory  Variable  Southern Central Northern 
Intercept   .0585  .0160  .0194 
Average Week Sold  awkit  -.0338 -.1283  -.1656 
Average Week Sold 
Squared  awkit
2  -.0010 .0035 .0039 
Total Volume  tvolit  -.0111 -.0118 .0001 
Number of 
Transactions  frequencyit  -.0978 -.1042 -.0821 
Gender  genderi  -.1342 -.0092  -.0715 
LR Statistic
a  χ
2  80.82 344.32  210.35 
a The null hypothesis 
The null hypothesis for the test of nonlinearity is Ho: γ = 0 and the alternative is 
not H0. The independent variable that is tested is predicted y
2.  The p-value results for the 
test for nonlinearity for the southern, central, and northern elevators are .6323, .4612, and 
.4583 respectively.  When the predicted y
2 term is added to the equation, it is not found to 
be significant.  Thus fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
The model was also estimated using random effects for each producer.  The test 
illustrated no random effects and therefore provides evidence that by including or 
excluding a producer will not affect the outcome of the regression.   
Estimations of the regression in equation (2) that is defined by (3), (4), and (5), 
are shown in tables 5, 6, and 7.  The tables show that each elevator has considerably 
different results for the regression.  The tvolit estimate is only significant at the southern 
elevator and is negative.  This most likely is purely coincidental because the other 
elevators did not exhibit this same occurrence.  The only estimate that is significant at all 
the elevators is that which is related to time and storage, awkit.  This estimate is negative;   11
thus illustrating that the longer a producer stores, the lower the expected price received.  
This theory of negative returns to storage in areas close to the gulf holds consistent with 
past literature.  Benirschka and Binkley claimed that areas close to the gulf should expect 
low returns to storage because of transportation costs increase as distance from ports 
increase.  As a result storage costs, or opportunity costs, decline with distance.  Number 
of sales, frequencyit, is not significant at any of the elevators.  The signs for this estimate 
also differ between the elevators.  It can be deduced that having a large are low number 
of sales per year does not have an effect on the expected price received.  The final 
estimate is for gender, genderi.  The estimate does not suggest there to be any variation of 
expected price between women and men.   
Table 5.  South Regression Model with lpriceit as the Dependent Variable  
Parameter  Estimate  t-value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1.1864  39.86  <.  0001 
1992 .0536  2.23  .0256 
1993  .0278 1.15  .2519 
1994 .0288  1.18  .2400 
1995  -.0136 -.57  .5677 
1996 -.0700  -2.96  .0031 
1997 .0247  1.05  .2956 
1998  .0373 1.53  .1271 
1999 .0383  1.46  .1454 
2000  0    
TVol -.0008  -6.02  <.  0001 
Awk -.0059  -11.43  <.  0001 
Frequency .0042  1.83  .0668 
Male
4 -.0210  -.85  .3930 
 
                                                 
4 Male represents the gender dummy variable for a producer to be male.   12
Table 6.  Central Regression Model with lpriceit as the Dependent Variable 
Parameter  Estimate  t-value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept .9261  134.53  <.  0001 
1992 .2029  27.16  <.  0001 
1993 .1486  20.93  <.  0001 
1994 .2753  37.42  <.  0001 
1995 .5901  84.44  <.  0001 
1996 .5159  69.30  <.  0001 
1997 .1984  27.04  <.  0001 
1998 -.0259  -3.62  .0003 
1999 -.1890  -24.20  <.  0001 
2000 0     
TVol -.0001  -.57  .5657 
Awk -.0017  -9.51  <.  0001 
Frequency -.0000  -.04  .9693 
Male -.0019  -.46  .6427 
 
Table 7.  North Regression Model with lpriceit as the Dependent Variable 
Parameter  Estimate  t-value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept .9566  83.67  <.  0001 
1992 .1700  18.68  <.  0001 
1993 .1625  19.90  <.  0001 
1994 .2777  34.56  <.  0001 
1995 .6078  80.49  <.  0001 
1996 .4667  63.53  <.  0001 
1997 .1765  24.37  <.  0001 
1998 0    NA 
1999 -.2166  -28.69  <.  0001 
2000 0     
TVol .0002  1.52  .1300 
Awk -.0014  -5.67  <.  0001 
Frequency -.0001  -1.29  .1974 
Male .0004  .04  .9661 
 
Past literature in behavioral finance found that women and men tend to react 
differently in financial markets.  If they are behaving differently in cash wheat markets, 
there does not appear to be any financial benefit related to net price.  This supports the 
theory of efficient markets, because both genders showed receive an average price over   13
time.  Neither gender outperforms the other; consequently no gains are found from 
fighting the markets, with respect to enhancing net price. The gender regression models 
are examined in the next section to see if gender differences exist with regard to number 
of sales, frequencyit, and timing of sales, awkit. 
Gender Regression Models 
The descriptive statistics in table 2 show the disbursement of gender between elevators 
and their means with respect to time of sales, frequency, and bushels sold.  There are less 
than 10% of producers that are women at the southern and northern elevators.  However 
there are 25% of the producers at the central elevator.  Because there is a higher 
population of women at the central elevator there should be more emphasis given to this 
elevator when looking at gender differences.   
The regression results for the regression with frequencyit as the dependent variable 
and volume and gender as the independent variables are given in tables 8, 9, and 10.  The 
total volume sold each year by producer, tvolit, is significant at all the elevators and 
positive.  Essentially this means that the more a producer has to sell the more often they 
will sell.  The gender variable is not consistent between the elevators.  However, it is 
positive at all elevators and significant at two.  At the central elevator, where there are 
more women producers, women have fewer sales.  The reason women sell less times in a 
year can be revealed in table 2, where the table for the central elevator shows that men 
have a higher volume of bushels sold.    14
Table 8.  South Model with frequencyit as the Dependent Variable 
Parameter  Estimate  t-value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1.1131  5.06  <.  0001 
1992 .5733  2.82  .0049 
1993 .0891  .43  .6640 
1994 .1862  .93  .3538 
1995 .7480  3.77  .0002 
1996 .3239  1.62  .1064 
1997 1.0012  4.99  <.  0001 
1998 .1668  .82  .4141 
1999 .0578  .27  .7836 
2000 0     
Male .4441  2.52  .0120 
TVol .0271  10.95  <.  0001 
 
Table 9.  Central Model with frequencyit as the Dependent Variable 
Parameter  Estimate  t-value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept .6502  4.13  <.  0001 
1992 .6248  3.25  .0012 
1993 .5535  2.98  .0029 
1994 .6202  3.31  .0009 
1995 1.4830  8.11  <.  0001 
1996 .6320  3.41  .0007 
1997 .6980  3.79  .0002 
1998 .3583  1.96  .0499 
1999 .0728  .38  .7023 
2000 0     
Male .6233  6.19  <.  0001 
TVol .1425  22.04  <.  0001 
   15
Table 10.  North Model with frequencyit as the Dependent Variable 
Parameter  Estimate  t-value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept 2.0180  4.91  <.  0001 
1992 -.3139  -.79  .4291 
1993 -.0820  -.22  .8221 
1994 .0656  .18  .8545 
1995 .6993  2.10  .0360 
1996 .6846  2.04  .0416 
1997 -.0726  -.22  .8262 
1998 0    NA 
1999 -.3576  -1.06  .2915 
2000 0     
Male .0147  .04  .9662 
TVol .1138  27.25  <.  0001 
 
The regression with average week of sale after harvest, awkit, as the dependent 
variable and gender and volume as the independent variables is shown in tables 11, 12, 
and 13. The volume variable is again significant and positive at all the elevators.  This 
can be interpreted as the higher the volume a producer sells, the later the average week 
they market their wheat will be.  This is similar to the frequency variable.  The more 
wheat a producer markets during a marketing year, the more transactions they will have 
and the later the bushel weighted average week they sell in will be.  The gender variable 
is not as simple to interpret.  At the northern and southern elevators it is positive and 
insignificant, yet the central elevator is negative and significant.  Because there are a 
higher percentage of women marketing wheat at the central elevator, it will be used.    
The negative coefficient is interpreted as men are selling earlier than women.  Which 
means women are storing longer.  However, this contradicts the volume theory where a 
producer will store longer if they have a larger volume of wheat for that marketing year, 
because women at this elevator have a smaller average volume of wheat and sell wheat in 
fewer weeks.  16
 
Table 11.  South Model with awkit as the Dependent Variable 
Parameter  Estimate  t-value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept 7.9047  4.78  <.  0001 
1992 -.5951  -.39  .6977 
1993 -2.3726  -1.54  .1243 
1994 .4539  .30  .7638 
1995 -.9891  -.66  .5080 
1996 -.7059  -.47  .6396 
1997 -.3229  -.21  .8305 
1998 2.6718  1.74  .0821 
1999 4.9011  3.10  .0020 
2000 0     
Male 1.2403  .93  .3505 
TVol -.0832  -4.47  <.  0001 
 
Table 12.  Central Model with awkit as the Dependent Variable 
Parameter  Estimate  t-value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept 13.8132  13.40  <.  0001 
1992 2.4918  1.98  .0476 
1993 2.0762  1.71  .0874 
1994 2.8654  2.34  .0195 
1995 1.4657  1.23  .2206 
1996 4.2054  3.47  .0005 
1997 2.4342  2.02  .0436 
1998 3.4424  2.88  .0040 
1999 6.6174  5.31  <.  0001 
2000 0     
Male -2.6374  -4.00  <.  0001 
TVol .0980  2.32  .0206 
   17
Table 13.  North Model with awkit as the Dependent Variable 
Parameter  Estimate  t-value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept 14.3574 7.94  <.  0001 
1992 2.3391  1.34  .1807 
1993 1.7098  1.07  .2866 
1994 2.0110  1.28  .2014 
1995 -.3151  -.22  .8289 
1996 2.6199  1.78  .0762 
1997 -2.6386  -1.81  .0700 
1998 0    NA 
1999 6.2177  4.17  <.  0001 
2000 0     
Male .6387  .42  .6765 




There were two objectives to this article.  First, to determine the extent to which time, 
gender, frequency of sales, and volume had on differences in net price received.  Second 
to measure differences in market decisions with regards to time and frequency of sales 
between women and men. The obvious finding in this article from the regression relates 
to storage.  From every regression, time appears to have a negative effect on price.  This 
may only be true for Oklahoma wheat farmers because of their early harvest and their 
close proximity to the gulf.  This is in agreement with Benirschka and Binkley because 
areas closer to the gulf should have negative returns to storage.  However, it does appear 
to maintain that markets are efficient.  It is imperative to realize that this anomaly could 
be a direct result of the cost of carry, or opportunity costs, which are used in this article. 
Volume and frequency of sales were not significant in the regression, leading to 
the conclusion that they did not explain the differences in prices between producers.  This 
means that a large farmer and small farmer should get the same price at the elevator and   18
that spreading out sales should not increase or decrease the net price a producer will 
receive.  It is interesting that there appears to be some gender differences, but it is hard to 
determine to what extent it is and how widespread.  It also can be assumed from the 
gender regressions that the larger a producer is the later they will sell and the higher the 
number of weekly transactions, however this was not one of the focuses of the article.   
  Barber and Odean found that men trade more than women in financial markets.  
This article found it also to be true for wheat cash markets to a certain extent; however, 
this could be related to the volume the producer market for that year.  It would be 
interesting to know if this might also be a factor in the stock market.  They also found 
men to be more overconfident, choosing to follow their own marketing styles trying to 
beat the market.  However, much of the literature suggests for Oklahoma wheat 
producers to market their wheat at harvest, and at the central elevator it appears that men 
are selling earlier.   
  In conclusion, the article agrees with past literature that wheat marketed closer to 
harvest should receive a higher net price.  But, this may not be true for other years or 
other carrying costs.  There does not appear to be any other factors explored in this article 
that would explain the differences in prices received by producers.  There are some 
differences between men and women on how they market their wheat, but it does not 
seem to account for price differences between producers.  Neither gender outperforms the 
other with respect to net price.  This model represents historical data at three elevators 
and should only be used as an aid in assisting the decision-making process.  It is not 
meant to predict future prices, but used as a historical measure of past influences in net 
price   19
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